SECURITY OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

September 06, 2021

SECURITY OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

This is a dissertation produced solely and exclusively for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements for Master of Business Administration (International)

Introduction

North-East Nigeria, comprising of six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe, has become the bedrock of unrest in the entire West African sub-region. The region has been emaciated by Boko Haram terrorist group. The terror group insurgency, which launched in 2009, has been going on between the sect and the Nigerian Government, are fighting for an Islamic caliphate in the region aimed at establishing sharia law in the country. This conflict has cost so many lives, estimated to well over 20,000, and damage to properties running into hundreds of millions. Schools have been destroyed, health facilities have been ravaged, and this conflict has left many residents deprived. North-East Nigeria is situated in a Sahel region with a temperature peak at 360C most of the year. It should also be observed that most indigenous peoples are poor farmers and are less educated in comparison to the rest of the country. The fear associated with the conflict has made some of the farmers to seek safety, with their families, in refugee camps set up across the northern parts of Nigeria (Niger: Fleeing Boko Haram Attacks, 2016).

Nigeria is among the largest agrarian countries, the world and the first in Africa in agricultural productivity. About 18% of its GDP and contributes about one-third of jobs in the country. It is a significant producer of many farm products, including cocoa, grounds (peanuts), rubber and palm products. While Nigeria is no longer a significant exporter because of the local consumers' boom, it is still a major manufacturer of various agricultural products. Cocoa-generation has grown from around 180,000 tonnes each year to 350,000 tonnes, most of them from outdated species and overweight trees.

The North-East region is known to have a low literacy rate coupled with a high number of economic deprivation hence a stable ground for socio-economic marginalisation, and with this, in mind, Boko Haram found a breeding place for its brand of Islamic radicalisation. To understand, entirely the problem posed by the sect one has to go back the general history of Nigeria from colonial days to present day. The pre-colonial history and method of absorption of Nigeria into the imperialist structure under British colonial rule primarily defined the trend and growth of Nigeria's geo-cultural and religious forces. Owing to centuries of interaction with Muslim North Africa, trans-Saharan commerce, before the 19th century Kanem-Borno and Sokoto's Jihad after 1804, the Northern regions of Nigeria are predominantly Muslim. Today the world is accessible to external powers at a breakneck pace through digital means of mass media and globalisation. Much of the southern portion of the country is predominantly Christian. This partially attributed to long-term interaction with European influences from the 15th century

In both territories, however, there are essential and diverse minorities and animists. Divide and rule socio-economic development strategies of colonial Britain reinforced North-South conceptions of separateness, preventing not just the creation of a pan-Nigerian uprising toward colonial rule, but also fossilising disparities and divisiveness. Such positions were reinforced by the rise and development in the late 1940s of a tripartite national system and ethnocentric political parties. The local characteristics and ideologies tend until today to affect Nigerian governance and democracy (Osaghae, 2002).

Aims

The dissertation aims to identify the impact that Boko Haram has had on North-East Nigeria’s economy and business. Moreover, the research aims to critically evaluate the issues that affect the local indigenes and their livelihoods. Furthermore, it seeks to present a range of actions that the government might undertake to improve business operations within the region.

Objectives

The objective of this dissertation is to:

1) identify and assess the underlining causes of the Boko Haram insurgency (2000-2019), and establish why it has become a significant force within sub-Sahara.

2) outline and critically evaluate the impact of Boko Haram on the economy of North-East Nigeria

3) make recommendations to the provincial government regarding supporting business in North-East Nigeria

Literature Review

In a void, the information does not matter. According to Aloeewa (2012), there are several theories in every discipline which explain the visible discrepancies within what people feel like, or what they deserve to do, and the "want" of what they get and the difference between "expected needs" and real needs fulfilment. The citizens react negatively when demand does not achieve accomplishment. Various writers believe that Boko Haram has only ended up making itself a public nuisance, and rather than been accepted has become a pariah to both the poor and government and its various agencies

The Boko Haram rebellion is plaguing Nigeria in a disconcerting and unparalleled way. A host of hypotheses can be applied in understanding Boko Haram's insurgency, some of which are the theory of friendship revenge, Islamic philosophy and anger. As a nation-state, Nigeria is facing a severe internal socio-economic and security challenge. More broadly, the challenge has socio-cultural, economic and political implications. Both of these factors have had a significant effect on the security of the country which can be traced back to ethnic groups, ethnic and religious tensions, violence, insurgency, corruption, socioeconomic vandalism and ecological destruction. (Aloejewa 2012).

Boko Haram is seen as or referred to as a terror group or insurgency group. The group still instils fear among the population of North-East Nigeria. The United States Department of State defines “Terrorism” as politically premeditated violence committed by non-national organizations or underground activists against non-combatant objectives, generally designed to affect a public (Zumve, Ingyoroko, and Akuva, 2013).

Terrorism is a breach of a peaceful system that starts in a specified political structure with disparities, bribery, and deprivation. It progresses from a frustrated reform effort that generates fear and rage to a political conflict that has exploded into violence. These failures can be used to rationalize the use of all forms of violence. Though violent terrorism, as with Boko Haram, is a political-strategic policy plan aimed at the threats to the populace with the added risk of the inescapable and inevitable loss of life and properties.

Insurgency, by definition, is a rebellion against a constituted authority; therefore, it can be seen as a revolt, though not all revolution is violent like the Boko Haram insurgency. Some uprising is peaceful, which uses people’s power to cause civil disobedience. There could be both peaceful and violent insurgencies – like the peaceful insurgency that overthrow Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines in the 1980s

If insurrection is used to describe a group's illegitimacy because of their actions, then such a group is not, in accordance with national and international laws, allowed to operate or seen as being neutral or lawful. However, when such activity threatens the authority or any other power, then its seen as "insurgent" often means that the rebels ' cause is illegitimate, while those who are part of the group will see the power of the state as illegitimate. The world mostly began to disapprove, discourse, and research the actions of insurgencies in the late 1960s – the views arrived at then are still very much accepted in today’s researches into the menace of insurgents (Eckstein, 1964).

Theoretical Approaches to Boko Haram Insurgency

Through the preceding year since 2009, lots of tragic news came out and were published on various media, from the frontline and conflict zones. Furthermore, these have painted a gloomy picture to the outside world of what is going on in that part of Nigeria. Even though states like Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States have suffered most from the direct influences of the fights, the three neighbouring states of Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi have taken in scores of internally displaced people, which is financially strenuous on the host communities, their economic resources, social services, and infrastructure. Places of learning have been damaged (some converted to refugee camps), health clinics destroyed, and many people have been left at risk by this crisis

One of the problems the conflict has caused is the hardship associated with the fighting. This has been ongoing for well over ten years and seems to have no ending, with no reprieve for the local population caught in the middle — thus visiting the affected area a precarious one (World Bank Report - Sahel's Refugee Crisis, 2018).

To understand Boko Haram, according to Anugwom (2018), one has to identify the group in contextual terms based on its core guiding principles and doctrines. The Social Identity Theory (SIT) approach to the group is quite important to grasp. SIT, seen as a social identity, is characterised as a concept which assumes some inter-group actions based on the presumed disparity in-group status, perceived justification and continuity of such variations and perceived capacity to move from group to group. In contradistinction, this is used to describe the particular conjecture regarding the various class of people in a society utilising the term "social identity theory." Besides, while some social scientists have regarded it like this, the theory of social identity was never initially intended for social classification in general terms. As relating to Boko Haram, the SIT of the group hinges on the Islamic doctrines, on disparity within the society and dislike for western education.

Another theory that has helped to shape the sect is the Relative Deprivation. This theory according to Peter Townsent (1979) opined that is hinged on the lack of recourses to maintain the food regimen, standard of living, social events and conveniences used or commonly promoted or accepted in the social system in which they belong by a person or group of people. The metrics of relative deprivation enables an unbiased correlation to the remaining community between both the circumstance of an identifiable group. Relative poverty can also illustrate the subjective emotions of the disappointment of n individual when one feels robbed by those entrusted to provide good governance, but the reliance on the individual's experience renders quantitative evaluation difficult.

The "relative poverty”, though mainly temporary in terms of relative deprivation theory, as the possible trigger of public revolution and divergence, thus contributing to sectarian and ethnic violence, such as protests, intimidation, civil wars and other social degenerate circumstances such as criminality, as stated by various social and political scientists and psychologists. Several researchers of psychological structures, for example, understand their development by referring to complaints by persons who feel that they are unable to see what they are entitled to have. Additionally, once their means do not fit their objectives, people indulge in deviant behaviour.

Agitation and frustration with the existence of a collective like Boko Haram in a pluralist or diverse culture, derived from a logical view of ideals, responsibility and disadvantages within the community along with other groups. Furthermore, during this comparative method, a detrimental equilibrium between these viewed inputs and advantage is shown or among the movement's share, and the chat of another group contributes to psychological dissonance which, apart from being instructive in the study of individual sections, can easily lead to conflict provocation.

The northeast of Nigeria, where Boko Haram is on the rampage the recruitment of youths is quite easy due to the feeling of been short-changed by the political elites in comparison to other section of the country, thus prompting the youths to engage in acts contradicting to their upbringing. The deprivation theory stipulates that those people who are robbed of certain things or services are far more inclined to take political, social and ideological action to address poverty than others. Of course, it is clear that in the North-East of Nigeria, socioeconomic disadvantages have deteriorated over time and the social Opportunity framework is seemingly completely non-existent and is significantly hampering the goals and aspirations of young people.

Nevertheless, in the sense of Boko Haram, the persuasive capacity of the hypothesis is weakened by the reality that it does not justify whether perceived poverty does induce activism in all classes. In this respect, studies are seldom a clear link between poverty and social-political demonstration, even though all equally influenced by the current socio-political and economic conditions in the Northeast and most have not warmed up to insurgency as Boko Haram has done. Indeed, although the theory of deprivation might well articulate ethnonational complaint, an exceedingly radical political act of violence as an insurgency would seem too convoluted. As a social group, it can not be generalised or considered popular characteristics of mainstream religion-loving religionists (Anugwom, 2018).

Insurgency is therefore used in causing lawlessness and can lead to change in a constituted authority, and secure power – these changes can either be bad or good. The findings of this research are that the Boko haram insurgency can be associated with inequality, economic deprivation, neglect of the social structural system. Conflict is inevitable wherever there is inequality occurring among groups. Hence three fundamental questions will be raised by this research:

1. What is the contributory factor to the rise in the insurgency?

2. What is the economic impact on the affected communities?

3. What is the likely future effect on the economies of the affected communities?

These questions will be answered to the best of the research ability without bias to any group or constituted authority.

The contributory Factors of the Boko Haram insurgency

Most observers, according to Felter, 2018, agreed that Boko Haram evolved as a result of deep religious and tribal fault-lines that have plagued the Nigerian society for a long time. During their almost half-century colonial rule, the British amalgamated diverse regions and ethnic groups that have little in common apart from close geographical vicinity. Nigeria contains approximately 350 ethnic groups, including the Hausa and Fulani (29%), the Yoruba (21%), the Igbo (18%), the Ijaw (10%) and the Kanuri (4%). Concurrently, Nigeria has divided mainly between both the North, dominated mostly by Muslims and the South, dominated by Christians. For decades, the two largest religious groups have traditionally adhered to an informal presidential power-rotation arrangement, but political tension remains an essential factor in the ongoing unrest.

The history of systemic corruption and injustice within all the strata of Nigeria also has led to the growth in the rise of Boko Haram, observers claim. Although it is the largest market in Africa and linked to a wealth of natural resources, Nigeria is on the record are the world capital for poorest people on the world. Approximately 80 million of its estimated 200 million population have a living of less than $2 a day; economic inequality is higher in the northern parts of this Muslim dominated region. A few politicians and their sycophants have long held a firm grip on Nigeria's commonwealth, and corrupt government officials were charged with wasting tens of trillions of dollars from the industry. Petroleum has been a leading engine of economic unbundling in the world, and Nigeria has an abundance of it.

In the engrossing confrontations among Christians and Muslims, the group was beginning to radicalise, and the security services decided to adopt stricter techniques toward alleged jihadists. In 2009 there was a flash for the group, just before an armed insurrection throughout the state of Bauchi, which eventually spread into the entire north-east, broke out with the police. In following demonstrations, the Government forces assassinated over 800 civilians, including several alleged leaders of Boko Haram. Muhammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was killed while in police custody after the revolt (Felter, 2018).

Economic considerations are acknowledged as one of Africa's primary triggers of war. Theorists think that in nearly all conflicts in Africa, rivalry for rare assets is a prevalent cause. Communities are fiercely competing for land, employment, education, religion, cultural, amenities, and decent universal healthcare services in socio-ethnic societies such as Nigeria. Okwudiba Nnoli (1980) created empirical instances in his research that link socio-economic variables with Nigeria's ethnic conflict. Based on J.S. Furnival, quoted in Nnoli (1980), "operating financial forces creates friction between conflicting interest groups" (Nnoli, 2008).

Various conflict analysts accept as accurate the social and economic variances among the diverse social clusters have massively contributed to the rising threats of Boko Haram. Furthermore, some social commentators are of the conviction that the authorities in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad are yet to comprehend whatever the actual problem is with all their omnipresent security system; how can a solution be projected? It is believed, and accepted in some quarters, as one of the reasons the conflict has continued because the wealthy ruling class and politicians do not care enough to give the poor the right tools to emancipate themselves from the shackles of poverty.

The disparity between the various social structure in the region, which has acted as a tool of domination for the ruling class. Nigeria’s northeast still practices feudal monarchical social set up and thus has helped to create a disparity amongst the rich and the poor. The inequality in the distribution of wealth (income), Matthew Page, a one-time the US intelligence community’s leading expert on Nigeria, believed that “It is this disparity between rich and poor, more than poverty itself, that generates anti-government sentiment and could fuel civil unrest down the road.” In a recent projection as published by the World Poverty Clock and compiled by Brookings Institute, Nigeria has the highest number of people leaving below the poverty line in the world. It is estimated that over 87 million Nigerians (out of population estimation of 190 million)were surviving on meagre $1.90 a day(Campbell and Page, 2018). Moreover, most of these people are in North-West and North-East of the country and has contributed immensely to the Boko Haram resources.

According to Adagba et al. (2012), falling wages, unemployment, and poverty among Nigerians, particularly young people, is a significant source of uncertainty and violent crime in Nigeria. Income inequality and the high unemployment rate among the youth in specific has led to the increasing instances of violent confrontation in Nigeria. Also, one of the country's primary triggers of feelings of inadequacy is the inability of consecutive governments to tackle the problems of poverty, unemployment, and unequal allocation of riches among cultural groups. So, the government has drained more energy to reduce the spread of insecurity and criminals throughout the nation than focusing on policies to ensure that the state economy is in good working condition for the overall well-being of Nigerians.

To provide alternatives for democracy and economic repositioning in Nigeria and to improve the provision of services central to stability and safety in the country, it is firmly perceived as a socio-economic development variable. The difficulty in resolving Nigeria's insecurity issue is to speed up growth. In this sense, development involves the creation of an economy that will provide profitable jobs, high-quality education services, and health services for individuals, with the social, financial, and physical infrastructure for company activities and infrastructure development.

According to Abubakar, (2006), who incisively argued that for democracy to take stable root in Nigeria, there has to be a strong foundation laid in terms of social and economic justice. He identified some of the issues as political and electioneering conflicts, socio-economic agitations, ethno-religious crises, ethnic militias, boundary disputes, cultism, criminality, and organised crime. His Arguing been that all the problems, together or separately, is a threat to the economic and social development of the country and not only in the North-East to avoid negative setback “implications on the continuity and survival of the nation's nascent democracy”. It should also be remembered that one of the main reason for Boko Haram's catastrophic insurgency is inadequate strategic intelligence and knowledge. combined with the systemic incompetence of elected representatives, government officials and military officers, as are other factors of rebellion in Northeast Nigeria: insecurity, religious bigotry, ethnic rivalries, injustice, poverty and competition among the political elite. Nevertheless, in Nigeria, there is an adversarial rivalry between both the dominant class and the disaffected group within the population (Newswatch, February 21, 2005:10).

According to NSACC.org.ng, 2019, corruption is seen by all as a hindrance to economic growth and prosperity in Nigeria. It is the plague affecting Nigeria's development. It is economical as well as a social parasite. It allows for deprivation, unemployment, and the unfair allocation of the resources of the countries among its people, which is the underlying cause of the Nigerians ' disillusionment. Some theorize that in a society where there is socio-economic equality, the fight against corruption (which has been the Achilles heel of Nigeria development) is easily won, provided that rights and privileges are not given to selected few but rather to all. In which each Nigerian will indeed be handled and positioned on the material, intellectual capacity, and ability to perform not depending on tribal or secular affiliation but merit specified, where there is no established prejudice.

Security, like other socio-economy components, increases and maximises the activity of a nation's business culture, but insecurity hinders such activity and is a danger to the economy. There is a powerful doubt that Nigeria's vision of being one of the highest 20 nations in the globe could euthanise if insecurity in our nation does not shrink. We need to attempt to reach a standard in which violations are wiped in the bud before continuation. Therefore, state, civil society groups, organisations, and people must struggle against insecurity so that businesses can feel safe and safe to attain their full potential to attain viable growth, complete capability, and the nation itself will be secure (Nsacc.org.ng, 2019).

The economic disparity and deprivation in North-East Nigeria can not be overemphasised as it has taken so many lives and has seen the destruction of properties and farmlands, with this security lapses the ideal plan is to save lives before anything else thus the triple effect of employment, poverty, and increase in the rate of out of school youths. The continuation of the conflict has made the region unfriendly to business irrespective of the size of the business.

Two powers, according to Suleiman (2015), are presently confining residents of North-East Nigeria, from fulfilling their livelihood. Boko Haram militants frequently focus their attacks on the weak and defenceless people while piling their trade – either in the local markets, farms, or tending to livestock - in the region, whereas the Nigerian military restricts the same people to within10 kilometres from their villages. As a result, individuals deprived of their established resources of livelihood: farming and pastoral nomads. The over-reliance on Federal government monthly allocation from the federation crude oil account has significantly disenfranchised the workforce, weakened the sustainable economy of the region and created wealthy corrupt officials in government.

The UNDP agreed to this assertion when the organisation stated in its report of 2015 that the action of the government has contributed to the hardship, through its introduction of tariffs on some products - the Government has imposed high trade tariffs on some of the trade piled by the local. These constraints are intended to limit a significant source of financing for Boko Haram, but they also end up affecting citizens, many of whom create their live trading fish. After Boko Haram was pushed out in some parts of the region, people are still astonished at the point of food insecurity and scarcity is being experienced in Region. To this end, locals have switched to unusual employment to survive. The Nigerian army, on the other, believed any action taken was to the general good of the security of the region.

According to the Army Chief, General Tukur Buratai, in a speech in 2017, believed the actions of the military, whether in favour of the civilian population or not, have contributed to the reduction of the activities of Boko Haram in significant cities and towns in North-East. The efforts of the military coupled with government initiatives in changing its strategic policies have led to the realisation that though several villagers in the North East have no access to their fields since they were all relocated, the bumper harvest observed in 2017 and 2018 is unparalleled even with the pre-insurgency era. This growth can be ascribed to the government's economic diversification strategy. The government's initiative to reinvigorate the Lake Chad Basin would go a long way in providing assistance and financial security to many people in this region. There is a need for governments, at both federal and state-level, to enhance their agricultural strategies in providing more assistance to local producers (Ahmed, 2019).

Economic

The government needs to strategise its economic policies in the North-East and Nigeria to bridge the poverty gap among its populace, this policy changes, according to Bill Clinton 2013, will help Nigeria to solve the Boko Haram insurgency and religious conflict. He added, thus, that Nigeria has key three questions of corruption, high rate of poverty and religious intolerance, adding that Nigeria needs “to somehow bring economic opportunity to the people who don’t have. This is not a problem specific to Nigeria.” (Compass Newspaper, 2013).

The impact on the economy of the North-East of the conflict has resonated throughout the country based on the fact that the lake Chad basin is a bastion of agriculture and accounts for a significant proportion food supply in the country. The strategy needed should not deviate from the regions agrarian nature but rather dwell on ways to improve the method of working in the sector. It is a manually demanding job, but there is room to improve on it with the introduction of mechanisation, provided the country is willing to invest adequately.

North-East Nigeria, according to Onuoha and Oyewole (2018), is the most impoverished in the country. The total maximum of 69.0% in terms of poverty is above the national average of 60.9%. Particularly severe is access to educational opportunities in the area with over 44% of children in the region out of school. This figure is about 26 times higher than the national average. Since 2009, Boko's operations have taken on a militant aspect, taking 20,000 to 30,000 lives and displacing about 2,6 million civilians. The crisis is worse than that. In April 2017, over N1.9 billion (US$ 5.2 billion) of buildings were decimated by Boko Haram. It devastation covers more than 1 million dwellings and five thousand schools. The loss of significant economic and social structures in the region caused significant disturbances in daily routines of the people in the areas affected, which contributed to numerous initiatives, such as the North East Development Commission (NEDC) and the Victim Support Fund (VSF), to mitigate the effects. Such measures are so noble and well-intentioned that they are not adequate for peace, prosperity and stability in the regions impacted. The economic and political stability of populations in the area needs to be improved (Onuoha and Oyewole, 2018).

According to Robert Muggah, 2009, many research studies and interview statistics indicate that previously abducted young people have a knowledge and skill gap and that they may require support to return to their route. In the ongoing, Boko Haram conflict young people face a complicated, competitive and skilled vocational pathway of entrepreneurial practices. Youth can be better creatively if sponsored by projects that are more likely to improve and expose them to expertise, resources, and job capital (i.e. start-up and operational funds). Government repatriation allowance and cash and household items years after relocation would probably contribute next to nothing to the wellbeing and prosperity of young people. Most NGO projects seem to have done better, encouraging vocational training and micro-enterprises. For instance, the effectiveness of such interventions has not yet been measured, and their real effect on economic and social development and reintegration is to be defined.

While successful, nevertheless, it is at most a limited and provisional approach to encouraging entrepreneurship initiatives. The report suggests that almost all young people receive only a minimal payment from casual labour and unusual jobs as the basis of work when living in refugee camps. Expanding vocational training and workforce development opportunities and training to increase the availability of these facilities would soon meet an unexpected challenge: a fall in demand. There is no clear evidence that markets in refugee camps will accommodate more small scale entrepreneurship than needed. The economics is straightforward: with these facilities increasing, prices will drop, rendering these practices unprofitable to everyone.

Undoubtedly the best possible way to help the populace to produce and earn an income is to revert to the north-eastern domestic economy original production core, a mix of subsistence cultivation, cash production, fishing and cattle rearing which has been devasted by the Boko Haram insurgency.

The based empirical evidence it is highly indicative of counter-productive targeting former youth fighters as a group, mainly as this can be stigmatising within the society. Instead, broad and diverse-based, inclusive funding, as we proposed for educational and economic initiatives, does not need to build categories or stigmatisation, mainly when it is "based on merit and needs." Instead, targeting services based on well-identified needs rather than combatant status for all war-affected youth may be more successful and less stigmatising than existing vulnerability categories, and yet by necessity only hit the most vulnerable. As described in Annan et al. (2006), the risk indicators include major injuries, analphabetism, underprivileged educational systems, chronic homelessness, social isolation, extreme mental disorder effects, and disputes with other community stakeholders. Changing from such a quantification framework to one based on particular, identifiable and urgent needs offers more excellent efficient and less stigmatising assistance selection (Muggah, 2009).

Economic Recovery, according to World Bank 2019, is far too slow to alleviate hardship in the lowest half of the population The agricultural production deficiency undermines poor rural opportunities, whereas massive food price aggregate demand affects poor and working-class lives. Notwithstanding consolidation in some regions of the economy, the job creation is and has always been lacklustre and grossly inadequate to withstand fast-growing labour market, leading to a high joblessness level (23% in 2018), with yet another 20% of the workforce struggling to make ends meet. The unrest in the northern part of Nigeria and thus the migration of the inhabitants are also adding to the elevated destitution rate in the northeast.

Although World Bank believes that Nigeria has improved socio-economically over the last few years, it continues to witness weakness in her human capital growth duly because of underinvestment in that sector, with the World Bank's 2018 Human Capital Index ranking Nigeria152nd out of 157 nations. The nation still faces significant obstacles to growth which involve rising oil dependence and inability to diversify the economy, fixing or building inadequate facilities and equipment, developing effective and efficient institutions and government fiscal policy and accountability problems.

Accordingly, the world body believes that the current administration will indeed grant the chance to speed up structural and economic changes to develop a strategic and economic structure that will handle the instability of the oil industry and promote the development of the non-oil economy. Audacious policies that could have a considerable overall effect on the economic path are removal the subsidies, eliminating currency trading and exchange controls, improving accountability and financial strategy complexity, and enhancing national revenue mobilisation.

These changes will further increase the quality of life in low-income groups while rising government infrastructure investment. With various project earmarked and invested in by the Nigerian government, along with WB, has increased its assistance in resolving service deliverance discrepancies, livelihood shortfalls and concerns for social homogeneity in Nigeria, and especially in the violence-affected North-East, and also supporting economic diversification. The Nigeria Electricity Transmission Access Project (NETAP) programme of $486 million aimed at achieving a reliable electricity sector through the reconstruction and upgrade of the power supply grids and lines in the country (World Bank, 2019).

Rebuilding

According to the UN publication of 2008, post-conflict countries are having increasingly significant challenges in many ways than weak, stable developing nations. These include severely eroded state capability, financial, personal and social wealth being lost, skewed opportunities for economic reasons, economic stagnation and high unemployment rate. There are also organised crime that steals their commonwealth and criminal gangs that refuse defeat. Such factors pose an ongoing threat of conflict-torn countries reverting to violence. Such gaps should quantify in the fiscal policy goals for post-conflict rehabilitation in North-East Nigeria.

This would include lowering the risk of repeated disputes and rebuilding credibility in civil, financial, economic and political institutions. In this framework, it is critical to improving state security ability for households and populations, including economic security, through the enforcement of the rule of law and the provision of vital social services, according to the results examined in this study. Besides, goals for economic recovery will concentrate on jobs, promote productive investment, minimise market costs, and rising community disparity. Thus, all the strategy for the improvement in the region should be based on the local resources and institutions, as many of them have adapted and evolved during the conflict.

Consequently, a sustainable economic recovery is not a return to pre-Boko Haram thresholds of revenue and living standards. These ensure that development must be maintained at considerably higher levels than the previous level, followed by significant job creation and initiatives aimed at reducing extreme horizontal disparities. Conditions like' recovery,'' reconstruction,' or' reconstruction' can indicate a return to the pre-conflict rule of law.

Nevertheless, social disorders, such as wealth inequality, deprivation, injustice, alienation, systemic collapse, weak political arrangement and economic mismanagement and corruption, have typically led to an intensified the regional conflicts in the sense of war. Consequently, the rehabilitation from post-conflict does not often entail the reconstruction of pre-war economic or administrative structures, but rather the creation of a new socio-political economy. It does not just rebuild back but build back uniquely and more significant social order.

The UNDP went further to describe the post-conflict plan as a set of policy analysis that needs looking into before implementation; these policy questions are:

(1) What kinds of policies are required to get the development process restarted?

(2) What must the national authorities strive for and what actions must they take?

(3) How can the international community be most helpful?

The importance of good post-conflict socio-economic recovery policy cannot be under-emphasised simply because a robust economic environment is essential for human economic development, and a broader economic recovery is essential to prevent the recurrence of terrorism within the post-conflict background (UNDP, 2008).

The efforts to rebuild North-East has to begin from the local communities before getting to both the State and Federal government levels. It is paramount to note that before these could be achieved, there has to be some level of stabilisation program in place to help booster confidence among investor alike as well as the returning IDP. The humanitarian and financial costs need considering as well to control the possibility of corrupt individuals hijacking the funds and equipment. The policy, adopted after the Nigerian civil war, could be improved on and adopted. This policy dwells on Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration.

With the estimated damage, according to Buratai 2017, there will be the need to divert some needed finance into rehabilitating the various infrastructures damaged during the conflict as well as treating traumatised victims of the war, or get the private sector to participate in the reconstruction of the region. One in four households impacted in the region has no recourse as a consequence of the war to socioeconomic growth while more than 650 public buildings are entirely damaged or destroyed or dysfunctional. The cost of the damage done by the conflict in an area with a long history of structural under-development throughout North East amounts to $8,29 billion (Ogbonna, 2017).

Large-scale changes threaten, according to the United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), has put a significant burden on disadvantaged populations. They still have insufficient connexions to essential facilities and programmes, further hinder revenue and livelihoods and raise pressure on capital. It has led to social pressures among IDPs, resettled persons and the hosting communities. Exposure to earnings and subsistence prospects for women in Nigeria has been typical of fewer and far fewer stable land parcels, less exposure to physical resources, less education and less utility to public services exposure. These results mean far less income and production than the male counterpart.

The extensive loss to essential government facilities and service providers, such offices like the Local Government Authorities, schools, clinics, markets and access to justice, is adding to the lengthy hardship of north-eastern marginalisation and debilitating economic development. Deprivation, growth and socio-economic position were somewhat weak in Northeast Nigeria before the insurgency, with comparative deprivation in 2010, hitting 76.3%. Insufficient infrastructure and weak public safety metrics are also a problem and are higher than the regional median - exposure to essential resources.

Overall, the Human Development Index (HDI), Nigeria placed 157 out of the 189, putting the nation in group 7 with poor human development. The steady increase in population has often helped to sustain the high level of poverty, with 37% and 28% unemployment among the youths in Yobe and Borno states remaining the world' s most vulnerable to underemployment. The shortage of social infrastructure and youth inequality has often been identified as a primary cause of sectarian violence, as various NGOs also provide youth with decent economic prospects.

According to UNOCHA and World Bank 2019, one of the initiatives focused on both the reintegration of various groups of people associated with the militant terrorist organisations, promoting constructive reconciliation and providing incentives and employments for young people. They formed collective security movements such as those of the CJTF during much of the war. Such schemes designed to help people discover their way back to normalcy and thus reduce the probability of a return to violent behaviour or crime and deter potential disputes.

The rehabilitation of erstwhile participants of Boko Haram conflicts is now a critical global concern due to two primary factors:

• Firstly, the incentives and method of encouraging low-level fighters to stand down and be rehabilitated have emerged to be a potentially poor method for murderous Islamist groups members in the light of the conflicts between the ceasefire negotiations and other vested interests.

• Second, such people who have come back to their communities – after a government rehabilitation programme, or have been released by the military – have often been subjected to prejudice, suspicion or even abuse.

The Populations are hesitant, especially so long as the perpetrators of the violence do not get sufficient assistance before those who are direct victims of the violent extremist organisations. Demonization impacts not just the ex-militants but their families, as well as anyone who was born out of involuntary forced into marriages within the community of perceived jihadists, women and girls abducted, others residing in managed territories of Boko Haram. As a consequence, there is still a significant risk that ex-members of Boko Haram will revert to the old ways and may even be subject to violent acts if they are struggling to tolerate them (Humanitarianresponse.info, 2019).

Infrastructure is critical to any economic development – structures like roads, hospital, school – to this end are fundamental, the Nigerian government has put in place a partnership scheme with the private sectors aimed at implementing a new framework for infrastructural development. This framework will provide the enabling environment for capital investment in the North-East, according to the rehabilitation cost provided by both government and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), North-East Nigeria will need well over $5 billion to provide necessary infrastructures in the area. One of the partners, Dangote Foundation, found the need to build housing units of 200 to cater for widows and children. The new housing community would be backed by irrigation kits, poultry plants, and fish ponds to increase their subsistence. Besides, a school with a cluster of ten classrooms and a library with well-stocked equipment and also a health centre was also constructed to help people's livelihoods and hygiene requirements.

To expand and improve, on economic mobility, enabling agricultural, industrial sectors, a solid foundation for infrastructure development is required. Concerning the reality that much of the areas of inadequate facilities, the pre-Boko Haram terror campaign has been demolished by the sect. Development prospects in the region significantly reduced as per the latest situational analysis carried out by the Nigerian government assessment works.

In line with the destruction of facilities, there is the need to have excellent medical facilities to treat those who are likely to suffer Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). If not checked on time., it will most likely add to the prevailing burden that may likely occur in the future generations that were caught up within the conflict needing psychological treatments. Such needs, if unchecked, can have an adverse effect on employability, health, and wellbeing, the emergence of new patterns of violence, especially domestic violence and gender and sexual violence.

Reaction to the trauma needs of the people is scarce and restricted at present. Moreover, consequential is the fact that businesses will need stable minds to work for it, there is a lack of awareness on the Government part for the need to have psychological treatment/assessment of the victims of the conflict. Furthermore, fewer than four regional centres for mental health operates in North-East and no system for linking the people impacted with these centres. Several projects among experts, civil society and government are presently underway to create a trauma structure and norms, but these are restricted in terms of population requirements. To this effect, the government will most important use this opportunity to improve on most of the facilities that are lacking This is not an environment that Nigerians are concerned about, and such traumas can cause fresh disputes when not untreated (PCNI, 2019).

Methodology

This research will examine the possible negative effect on the economy of North-East Nigeria and expansion in Nigeria of the Boko Haram acts of terrorism, concerning economic implication and the general well-being of the population. The information was produced using secondary data — books, newspaper articles, magazines, and web resources — for this study. Content analysis methods were used to process data. The main population is North-East Nigeria while putting more emphasis on Borno State, the central conflict theatre.

In gathering pieces of information in the course of this research, as figure 000 below shows, a combination of Qualitative and Quantitative methods were used and applied to some degree. This was solely based on the knowledge that both methods would give a clear and articulate understanding of the findings, reviews and recommendations that are likely to be analysed and made. This approach is in line with various researches, papers and journals that reflect on the chosen topic.

The methodology will make critically evaluate on various socio-economic approaches adopted by the various governments of Nigerian tackling poverty in the country; but are more likely to focus on the negative aspect – corruption, education and religious bigotry. As a result, some statistics would be looked into and adapted, while some other works of literature relating to the topic would also be looked into thereby giving a transparent approach and understanding of the inherent problem caused by Boko Haram within the North-East and Nigeria as a whole.

The emphasis of this analysis is how conventional society perceives the threats posed by Boko Haram on businesses and livelihood and contain the threats the sect poses. The way the knowledge was gathered is explained in this technique section; the analysis framework is discussed. In reality, the ethical issues factored into the equation in the writing of the thesis are revealed.

All the information collected and used were mostly secondary data from various sources. The data were collected to make a comparison with various theoretical findings of this paper. In doing this, the credibility and authenticity of each piece of data were considered; this was determined by the application of trustworthiness principle as described by (Bryman and Bell 2011).

The literature review on Boko Haram laid the foundation of research on which various hypothesis was made and arrived. The pieces of information used were mostly analytical in the sense that they only put together and analysed to arrive at the message this paper aims to convey. The use of observation, studies and application of various data; all aimed at answering the central questions posed in this research paper.

The data therein will be based on the years Boko Haram has been active, i.e. 2009 to date,(data collation period of this research), and the impact on the socio-economic wellbeing of the people of North-East Nigeria in particular with some emphasis on Nigeria in general. Thus the theoretical framework is focused on the economic, infrastructural and psychological damage caused by the action of the actions of the Boko Haram sect its quest to establish its brand of Islamic doctrines in the North-East part of the country. Though, in the course of this paper, little emphasis was given to the doctrines of the group, as the dictate of the paper is broadly economies and businesses.

Findings

Freedom C. Onuoha (2014), believed that “High levels of illiteracy linked to youth radicalisation and extremism” in his paper “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” identified some likely issues that have contributed to the rise in the number of Boko Haram membership. These factors, seen as the main reason behind the continuation of the conflict despite the Government efforts, both military and political. These factors are:

1. High level of illiteracy in North-East Nigeria

2. Ignorance of religious teachings

3. High level of unemployment and poverty

4. High corruption rate among the ruling class

Across the affected regions, it has been established and identified that there is a high level of illiteracy compared to other parts of Nigeria, and this has contributed to the number of young people joining the Boko Haram sect. The affected areas have a low level of literacy index measurement against other parts of Nigeria. Poverty, analphabetism, and radicalisation are linked; they are more associated in the North-East region of Nigeria. It is more likely that parents in these regions will not afford to send their children to school and will most likely be illiterates, unemployed, and therefore susceptible to hiring and religious extremism.

High level of illiteracy in North-East Nigeria

The study produced across the effected region recognised elevated rates of illiteracy as one of the significant variables affecting the acceptance of negative religious convictions by young adults. In the state of Gombe, illiteracy was placed second out of the 16 identified variables. In Yobe state, was listed second on the list. It was mildly smaller in the state of Borno, where it has been rated fourth from the 16 variables mentioned as triggers of extremism and terrorism among young people. It was quoted as vital in Kano by 75%. It is easier to control ignorant individuals since their place of social misery prevents them from having the ability and understanding to critically challenge stories and teachings of extremist groups like Boko Haram. While it is evident that the weapons used by Boko Haram are not products of analphabets, documents, obtained from captured leaders of the sect, indicate the actual suicide bombers and foot troops of the militant are taken from such "poor, trapped communities," indicating how poverty, absence of schooling, and false religious indoctrination add to terrorism.

There has always been cultural resistance attributed to the enrolment into secular education in Northern Nigeria with the locals, especially the poor preferring Islamic education, that is easily influenced by radical views, to the western style of education. This belief has prompted Wole Soyinka (a Nobel Laurette), in 2012, to take the stance that most of the foot-soldiers of Boko Haram are as a result of lack of secular education to the preference of Almajiris type of education. However, it should be cited that some other reasons some parents in Northern Nigeria prefer not to send their children to secular schools are purely financial, and high cost associated with it, and not as a result of distrust to Western education.

While, in Northern Nigeria, according to Ojochenemi, Asuelime and Onapajo, 2015, the slender marginalisation in western education is partly attributable the British and partly to Northern Emirs (traditional rulers) unwillingness, throughout colonial times, to implement Western education into the province. The Quran educational institutions, dating back to the eleventh century, were the popular platform for early childhood education in the region. In the early 19th century, the establishment of Islam in the northern region became more significant. The lack of investment in the education sector by previous governments of Nigeria, especially the military governments, has contributed to the high level of economic, social, and political ignorance among the young population of Nigeria. These, in turn, has left a big gap for the exploitation of youths in all level of national development.

Such Muslim religious colleges, the educational system for Almajiri, not only boosted, but they were also significantly expanded in numbers. In the 1900s the college, for instance, expanded to 27,600 with 423,000 pupils (Awofeso et al. 2003) out from 20,000 schools with 250,000 pupils. In 2005, the National Council for the Protection of the Destitute (African Report 2010) estimated that there were nearly 7 million Almajiri children in northern Nigeria. More than 80% of the 3.7 million population of Kano alone in 2008 attended an Islamic School, between the ages of 5 and 21 years range. Of course, depending on the context of the teaching, this age range of the populace is much more vulnerable to violent behaviour, and teachings. Nevertheless, given the large proportion of the regional population (against the rest of the country), less than 30% of university students are from the northern part of Nigeria(Umar 2013, p20). The disparity is seen not only in tertiary education but also primary and high school attendance, which are necessary for higher education.

Moreover, Ojochenemi, Asuelime and Onapajo, 2015 went further to state that only 450,000 out of the 3.5 million nomadic kids of school age are receiving some education based on the most recent UNESCO (2012: p.1) estimates. The report indicates that seventeen out of 36 (along with Abuja) states are in danger of failing to meet UNESCO’s EFA target 4 by 2015. Surprisingly enough, in the northern part of Nigeria, the states with a majority Muslim and agricultural-based populace that have low literacy services for young people and adults between 14.5 and 49.39 (for the total population). Some of those states are Taraba 23.3%, Yobe 26.6%, Zamfara 33.9% Borno 14.5%, among other things. Compare this pattern with Southern regions education ratings such as 92% for Lagos, 80% for Osun and 72.8% for Rivers States.

In comparison, western education in Northern Nigeria, as far as adult literacy is concerned, demonstrate that explicitly at the statistical rate, for men much worse than their southern equivalents. In contrast to 82.6 in the south-south area, adult education among the males is 73.1 in the north. The condition with women is far worse. It is against this perspective that Rev. Matthew Kukah, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sokoto in northern Nigeria, concluded that Boko Haram's popularity, driven by the fact that so many children do not have ample formal training. Hence easy to be doctrine into a Quranic style of teaching marked by disdain for Secular education through various travelling instructors. Cognising about the low educational level in the north and the impact it played in boosting the ranks of Boko Haram, the regime of President Goodluck Jonathan, from 2009-2015 updated and introduced several institutions to help popularise western education and reduce the influence of false Quranic teachings in Northern Nigeria(Ojochenemi, Asuelime and Onapajo, 2015).

Ignorance of religious teachings

The absence of profound understanding of real religious learning partially linked to three observable hazardous developments in Nigeria's latest exercise of faith: the spread of sects in both Islam and Christianity, the spread of autonomous religious leaders in both cultures, and the growing dependence on preachers rather than on the scriptures themselves. As a consequence, youth are highly susceptible to be attracted and radicalised by autonomous and wandering religious zealots, radical groups, and spiritual demagogues, who would often misrepresent religious orders. With a high level of illiteracy comes the high rate of ignorance within the society and dependency on the words and teaching of those who are more educated. Kashim Shettima, the then Borno state governor in 2014, also lends credibility to this assessment when he subsequently acknowledged that "the militants' twisted interpretation of the Holy Koran "landed us in this mess" and “there is no room for extremism in Islam.”

In accepting this exact stance, one-time Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria, Bamanga Tukur, agreed that the rise in disorder associated with Boko Haram was as a result of hurt felt by the populace due to the high cost of goods, high rate of poverty, unemployment and the inability to afford the essential things for sustenance. He believed that the action of the sect would, at a point, get to the doorsteps of the rich and the ruling class and politicians: “Unless we remove the hunger, we too may not be able to rest.” North-Eastern Nigeria's war is the consequence of a battle over restricted funds and corruption. The biggest conundrum is that nations with an abundance of natural resources almost always experience less economic growth than countries without natural resources. Reliance on a few income sources typically discourages long term growth, leads to economic overheating, and increases price and income uncertainty (Onuoha, 2014).

The sect, according to Ushe, (2015), believes that its brand of religious bigotry is the ultimate in the Islamic world. Hence had to adhere to by its members and those under its territorial control. Its aims to have total Islamic doctrine in the whole country. This indoctrination approach gives the sect the notion that all economic activities should be based on the Islamic teachings hence adding more hardship to the impoverished society. Boko Haram attacks everyone not upholding their distorted interpretations of Islam. This indicates that they often also attack more conservative Muslims or Muslims not coming from the same right-wing and militant rhetoric system as described by the sect. One research states that there has always been Muslim in the bulk of its casualties amid Boko Haram's killing animosity to Christians, not necessarily regardless of the rebellion in a mainly Muslim region of the country. The consistency of the attacks and killings has only ended up affecting the way of life of the people, both Christian and Muslims, in terms of socio-economic security of life and not the religious belief of the people

The religious negativity of Boko Haram gained ground due to the impact and effect of corruption and poverty, which are like Siamese twins. Both have become endemic in the socio-economic and political fragments of the Nigeria society. These social ills in Nigeria are blamed for the stated economic growth and low level of structural investments which has readily contributed to a large number of improvised Nigerians. These enemies (corruption and poverty) has contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram as a reaction to socio-economic inequality and government injustice in the North and Nigeria in general. The sects that flourished have helped with the widespread socio-religious bitterness and societal influence of cultural displacement coupled with dissatisfaction among the populace (Ushe, 2015).

The uncertainty inherent within the society has also tickle to the Boko Haram sect based on its ideology. According to Edlyne Eze Anugwom,(2018), the inconsistency in the sect’s approach to its objectives has lent credence to the belief that there is no clear strategy, other than to be deceitful to the vulnerable youths and cause mayhem with the North-East of Nigeria. Even though there have been many efforts to determine if Boko Haram have any philosophy and what such philosophy is, whether the sect has any coherent vision or not, and that has made various commentators and analysts believe that Boko Haran has nothing to be considered doctrine or concrete concepts which direct the movement's actions concerning their brand of Islam. While Boko Haram does not have an evident or clearly defined Islamic philosophy, the widely recognised theory seems to refute this both in its speech of the aims of the movement by its leaders and even in the group's operation.

Thus, the no ideology argument is mainly insignificant and contingent on the conceptualisation of the accepted philosophy. Ideology commonly referred to a form of dogma, theory or set of convictions/ethics to which a particular social or political entity ascribes. In other terms, the belief system of a group reflects its goals and expectations. Though most scholar would point out that ideology has to have consistency, be coherent to support a narrative of a group, but in the case of Boko Haram the ideology it claims to represent, fall short of the Islamic doctrines mainly because of the sect inability to define its motives for the conflicts.

Accordingly Anugwom 2018, went further to state that Boko Haram's philosophy, therefore, is not only rooted in a radical version of fundamentalist Islam but also guided by the central faith in the “Takfir” concept, particularly as it relates to all the other Muslims who are neither adherents nor followers. Under this philosophy, all Muslims not practising (determined as so-called moderate Muslims in the Boko Haram sphere) should be seen as apostates or comparable to infidels and the true believers are primarily committed to abandoning contaminated and unclear injection of non-Muslim belief systems to find a new environment away from the religiously polluted communal settings.

Boko Haram thus has a belief system at a significant and cursory scale. Boko Haram's Vision, or it is explicit messaging, recruiting communications and over-arcing policy and organisation framework, all of which endorse a core denial of modern teachings and beliefs and neither as systemic nor nuanced as the trend with other Islamic values. The statement of the former sect head Mohammed Yusuf on explanations for the sect is a reasonable way to evaluate the authenticity of the above description. In response to Boko Haram's accused of peddling false Islamic teachings resembling that of Prophet Muhammed message to the end-time false prophets, preachers, and authors will appear, Yusuf explained what might as well be a sort of philosophy. The believers must, therefore, be interested in knowing and dedicated to the ethics and morals of Islam (Anugwom, 2018).

Ignorance of religious teachings

These enemies (corruption and poverty) has contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram as a reaction to socio-economic inequality and government injustice in the North and Nigeria in general. The sects that flourished have helped with the widespread socio-religious bitterness and societal influence of cultural displacement coupled with dissatisfaction among the populace (Ushe, 2015).

The statement of the former sect head Mohammed Yusuf on explanations for the sect is a reasonable way to evaluate the authenticity of the above description. In response to Boko Haram's accused of peddling false Islamic teachings resembling that of Prophet Muhammed message to the end-time false prophets, preachers, and authors will appear, Yusuf explained what might as well be a sort of philosophy. The believers must, therefore, be interested in knowing and dedicated to the ethics and morals of Islam (Anugwom, 2018).

High level of unemployment and poverty

As a result of the structural adaptation programs, Nigerians were further impoverished because of the decreasing financial prosperity from the 1990s. All of these circumstances, along with the poor management of restricted funds and the governing class' insensitive show of riches despite severe deprivation, lead to religious rage and disappointment. It has been recorded in both comparatively and in absolute terms the bad existential status of individuals in the North-East of Nigeria. Together with a significant unemployed young workforce, these variables lead to a wicked spiral of poverty and harmful religious indoctrination (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

With big companies closing down, the tendency is to have a large number of employed people, which in turn affects small-scale businesses as there will be less capital going around or available to make purchases, thus fuelling the high rate of corruption. Corruption in Nigeria has been endemic in recent years and therefore, has contributed to the level of deprivation in the country. These have contributed to the rise in street begging, especially among the people of impressionable age. According to Amman, his findings the high rate of begging in the Northern part of Nigeria is a result of the adoption of Almajiris (a form of Islamic education for young people) for religious reasons by Islamic scholars in Nigeria. A large number of these people almost end up roaming the streets of North-East Nigeria; they are more fallible to been assimilated by the Boko Haram sect. It should be noted that most of these Almajiris do not have parental figures. There are well over 3.5 million such people in the street of North-East Nigeria(Amman, 2009).

Institutional and socio-political corruption is a monster that has kept Nigeria stagnant and undeveloped; it has helped to contribute to the failure of the government and the disintegration of the social facilities. Nigeria's insecurity is due primarily to failure by the government, which is traceable to economic and socio-political corruption. It has contributed heavily to armed conflict that has undermined social values and function. Cronyism is a big problem even though money and benefits change hands, but also because it mismanages essential elements of the government's entire existence, circumventing inclusion structures, policy discussion, and choice. It is defined as cancer that actively works against all the growth of Nigeria, although the structure of Nigerian culture is under pressure by bribery. Corruption, within the system, has hampered economic growth, impoverishing further poor Nigerians overwhelmingly, and destabilising growth and support efficacy.

Poverty induced violence is generally accepted to be intertwined to increase the likelihood of crisis instability by rendering the world more likely to engage in civil wars. Previous research established macroeconomic variables, which increased the possibility of armed conflict in countries. For instance, low per capita income and broad demographics are most likely linked to civil conflicts, though ethnic and religious complexity does not make the country more conflict-prone (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013).:

Pinstripe-Anderson and Shimokawa (2008) asserted that "poverty, hunger and food insecurity, together with a very unequal" allocation of revenue and other tangible resources, give rise to rage, despair, desperation and a feeling of injustice and absence of social justice, creating an environment of stress that contributes to violence. The North-Eastern Nigeria, where the Boko Haram arose, was especially disadvantaged and suffered from different types of deprivation. For example, Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart (2007) 8 SAGE Open found north-eastern horizontal imbalance: infant mortality was 93.9 per cent higher than the Southwest rate. Also, the North-East has been the region in which each state resides in abject poverty, on average, 74 per cent of the population. These kinds of disparities cause abuse and rebellion (Murshed & Gates, 2003).

High rate of corruption among the ruling class

The above statement has credibility when applied to Nigeria. In 2018 corruption index released by Transparency International score Nigeria low in the table of corruption among other countries – 144th position out of 180. According to the Body, corruption has always been a talking point in Nigeria. However, the government has taken steps to fight corruption with Establishing of a presidential counselling council on corruption, enhancing anti-bribery law and policy background, and developing a federal anti-corruption approach in areas such as government procuring and asset disclosure. Nigeria is seen as a country with potentials, but the contrast to the positivity are weak institutions, low or half-baked democratic values, and unresponsive political systems are all contributing to the high rate of corruption in the country (www.transparency.org, 2019).

In general, corruption is a deliberate or unintentional breach of trust and protocols supposedly governing the conduct of a particular profession, operations of public services, private transactions, private and company contracts which are selfish, dishonest gains which cause someone else, system and society to suffer from any disadvantages.

Corruption has infected all ensuing governments, both military and democratic. It has generated a worsening fastened situation, which reveals itself to be most serious since 1984, despite support and improved income from crude oil. This combines the middle-class Nigerians with burgeoning hardship, destitution and degeneration among Nigerians. It is a distasteful mixture. Winner-take-all conflicts, institutional cynicism and aggression control political scene as economies and social structures decline. According to Segun Osoba, 1995, the corruption within the economy and the society at large is such that strata of the country feel the negation effect. with this, in mind, there is the tendency for the young demographic of the country to feel disenfranchised and as such are more likely to be influenced by harmful doctrines, in this case, Boko Haram. He went further to state that that various governments of Nigeria have exhibited the tendency to be corrupt and as such has had limited impact in terms of the development of the country

The abundance often leads to mismanagement and corruption within the government as well. Some school of thoughts has stipulated that the higher level of being with the system is as a result of unchecked activities of government officials who believed that they are above the realms of the law. At one stage, the former governor Shettima thought that some wealthy leaders and corrupt politicians were fuelling the dispute, and at one stage accused the Nigerian federal government of complacency in dealing with the dispute. Several social scientists and NGOs have addressed these concepts (allAfrica.com, 2019).

The parameters of the dispute are between capitalist groups and between different cultural, religious, and other classes. Different issues have been raised that have contributed to the lack of indecision from the Government of Nigeria and neighbouring countries. At one point, some politicians from the northern part of the country were accusing the government of trying to depopulate the region by encouraging the escalation of the conflict. Some of these politicians are the current president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, and the current governor of Kaduna State of Nigeria, Nasir el-Rufai (Mbah, Nwangwu, and Edeh, 2017). While some unbiased minds, from the academia and religious quarters, have come out to accuse politicians of exploiting the conflict for their political gains by pretending to care during the election campaign and subsequently abandoning the people after the election. Such a body like the Christian Association of Nigeria(CAN) has been accusing the government of “cherry-picking” in the fighting against the insurgency by not doing enough to protect the vulnerable, especially the women and children. These have as a result of persistence abduction of young women and female aid workers in the conflict zone; while at the same time being biased with the plights of Muslims and Christians captives (Onapajo and Usman, 2015).

According to Olusoga (1981), when there is a severe analysis of the triggers of violence in Nigeria, the emphasis should be on the government's official corruption and incompetence. The inability of the State to display its features or achieve the goals it considers as natural or suitable for all of its people. Their analytical energies must be based on widespread corruption. The anthropology on the causes of terror, especially from public circles, will feel compelled to connect contemporary acts of terrorism in Nigeria, arguably or consciously to widespread corruption, and the Nigerian state which has negated the wishes of the populace.

If this supposition, based on the definition of corruption is something that should go by, economic inequality and a poor quality of life in society are due to social violations of socially responsibility ethical conduct resulting in the embezzlement, to the well-being of all, of society's scarce resources. The inability to carry out its allegedly correct obligations also implies corruption that effectively fosters terrorist crimes as a means of protesting abuses of power (Olusoga, 1981).

Besides, the tactical view of presenting inequality and injustice to recruit more people into the ideology rings true. Due to the ruling elite's perceived social injustice, by the young unemployed Nigerians, "who rarely eat more than one meal a day," they quickly join the group. The Department State Service (DSS) has disclosed that certain people are protecting Boko Haram militants, which undoubtedly makes it very problematic for law enforcement to curb the operations of the group (Yemi, 2012). People who are disheartened by the unfettered magnitude of the corrupt conduct of the politicians are readily persuaded to rebel toward the state, notably when these messages are placed on a religious basis.

Matthew Page, 2019 has a similar perspective when he stated that there are also corruptions within the civil service, that has also contributed to the increase in the conflict in the North-East. The illegal practices from licensing inspectors scam, safety manager extorting, police brutalisation at various security checkpoints, customs agents and people from the local association - the People are often affected by widespread fraud within government programmes aim to help the citizens. Such services seem to benefit very few small businesses despite the high costs. They have been doomed from the start–thereby weakening public confidence and serving as outlets of misappropriation, procurement theft and the exchange of political funding. From 2014 to 2018, this downward movement of corruption equates to over $1 billion — more than the cumulative health and education investment in the country, during the same period.

Some of the agency and programme that has been accused by various quarters as the means of encouraging a systematic corruption includes TradeMoni and various youth empowerment programs, which has raised red flags in the ways its been operated. The red flags of corruption exhibit these agencies and programmes. They are lacking in accountability, are deprived of responsibility, have heavy administrative burdens and are protected by red tape. The politicians, handpicked winners and deals steer their mates regularly intervene with them. This type of corruption strengthens itself even more troublingly. It diminishes the viability and influence of small enterprise programmes, increases the need for help and thus facilitates the justification of expensive follow-up initiatives for politicians (Page, 2019).

Conclusions

To understand the predicament been faced within the Nigerian North-East regional economic growth, Porter’s Diamond Theory could be applied and made use of for proper socio-economic growth. This theory stipulates that individual countries can create a productive atmosphere which will help to factor the relevancy in positive policy-making decisions and strategies. These policies fall into elements which are believed that the communities, with the help of the government, can create by itself bearing in mind the substantial human resources that are inherent in the region.

Porter (1985) believes that variables are more critical in assessing the comparative advantage of a nation than simply inherited variables such as "land and natural resources". It also indicates that the primary function of government in driving the nation's economy is to enable and urge businesses throughout the nation to concentrate on the production and growth of the elements of factor conditions. One strategy for the government to attain this aim is to promote rivalry amongst existing firms through the establishment and implementation of anti-trust legislation.

Porter (1985) had stated that “the only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level is productivity”, and Stressed that economic development is the priority of government policies for sustainability. Porter claims that perhaps the growth capacity of a nation or market is defined by its readiness to promote productivity, produce, sustain and retain commercial practises that will guarantee growth. This idea hinges on the knowledge that good government policy can transcend (FACTOR CONDITION) to excellent business opportunities (CHANCE) and create good competitiveness

With a transparent policy (government creating chance and factor condition), there is a spike in investors’ interest in the local economy (firms strategy, structure and rivalry). This will also create other auxiliary industries (related support businesses), at the end of the chain are consumers who are most likely to require the products (home demand condition), see figure 2: Porter’s Diamond Model (Porter, 1985).

Accordingly, Atkinson (2013). believed that competition is not the same as efficiency. Throughout his opinion, competition applies to the economic stability of the trading business sectors of a country. A country may have steady output in specific industries and yet be economically unhealthful by not providing enough employment. To him, economic prosperity may only be specified in terms of the capacity of the areas of the economy of the country to add value and thereby generate employment. While Onyemenam (2004) argued that what describes competition is the degree of dominance with which a corporation or country generates products, services and other associated functions as opposed to peers. The societies are said to be successful in implementing a set of socio-economic policies that prioritise and encourage private businesses as a guiding force for development and that take precedence around market-oriented policy and the related public structures and tend to witness developmental change. The factors and element the Diamond Theory will focus on are listed below:

1. The socio-Political Impact on Affected Communities;

2. The Effect on The Socio-Economies of The Affected Communities;

3. Sustainable socio-economic programme;

4. Education reorientation.

5.1 The socio-Political Impact on Affected Communities

The economy impacts viewed from two perspectives – the physical impact and emotional impact. As it may be, these impacts have adverse effects on the communities. With damages to medical facilities comes the shortages of medical personnel and medical equipment hence the likelihood that the injured will not get the right medical help needed. As well as medical shortages, there is the twin effect destruction of social amenities. In conflicts, there tend to be shortages, and this is most likely to have an adverse effect on the wellbeing of the people, thus creating desperation among the people. The hardest-hit demography group in any conflict are children. According to Dun, 2018, the Boko Haram conflict has multifaceted effects on children's health.

Community and family assets, reduced as funds are taken away from public services, food, as well as other commodity prices, increase, and fear or physical barriers stop health care providers from achieving livelihood operations - the destruction or otherwise inaccessibility to amenities such as medical centres, banks, and potable water. Food distribution chains and vital medications are frequently interrupted. People may need to abandon a conflict zone, which may expose and deprive people of their livelihoods from inefficient shelters, water, hygiene, and food (Solanke, 2018).

With war injuries, displacement, and unemployment comes to the increase in the number of beggars in the street, most notably among children whose family has lost their means of income or have been made orphan as a result of the conflict. According to UNICEF (2019), one child out of four lives in war or crisis nations. As of 2018, almost 31 million kids, which include 13 million child refugees and more than 17 million in their nations, were internally displaced by violence and war. Children's attacks remain unchecked. Warring sides are violating one of the worst fundamental conflict laws: the protection of children. This level of neglect is bound to create a considerable number of child destitute as being a witness in Nort-East, Nigeria. With this level of beggars roaming the streets, it has made things worse by the high rate of unemployment in the region. These, with the large numbers of beggars, has caused a conundrum of social proportion. These challenges have overwhelmed a system overshadowed by corruption, incompetence, and the shortage of human resources. Like most of Nigeria, the North-East has a large population of youths who are unemployed and with no artisan skills. While these youths roam the streets, they are more likely to be indoctrinated into bad groups, ideas and with the case of Boko Haram into wrong religious beliefs. The sect attracts its followers mainly from disenfranchised youth, jobless high school and university graduates who are homeless, and mostly from low-income families.

The insurgency has created and made some families destitute with the creation of various refugee camps called “IDP camp,” these are families at one time were able to feed themselves but currently, are dependent on handouts from charitable organisations for their welfare thus adding more burden on the already stretched fragile economy.

Insecurity also raises corporate security expenses. The costs of taking measures and paying for private security services come directly from this. Most company organisations in Nigeria operate, in particular, to guarantee the safety of their assets and the life of their employees and clients, retain the safety personnel and security of their resources. The loss of assets may also is caused by the burning of commercial buildings and assets. Also, it confines the company's flows of funds, according to General Buratai 2017, the estimated cost of the Boko Haram conflict to Nigeria especially to the North-East of the country stands at $9 billion with the State of Borno baring the most burden of more than $5 billion. The destruction of farmlands has cost local farmers to lose income to the tune of $3.5 billion. The conflict has destroyed nearly half a million homes – 95% in the State Borno alone. In retrospect, the repair and recovery in the area will take a while to accomplish (Ogbonna, 2017).

Agreeing with the above assertion, Matfees, 2017, stated that it is challenging to grow economically and socially in the middle of a prolonged rebellion. Citizens have also worked to rebuild, recover, resume and stabilise their lives and revitalise their communities in regions where the insurgency has been defeated. Nigeria's military gains are sporadic— authority remains challenged in some areas, and gains and loss could alter within hours or days. In the Chad Lake Basin, Boko Haram has managed to make agriculture problematic and sometimes unfeasible in certain places during the farming seasons, hence making life hard for the populace. The insurgent group have also interrupted commercial routes.

While geopolitical control of Boko Haram, for now, is confined to some small towns and villages and small rural areas, the Group strategic switch according to Anugwom, E. 2018, has aided the group to remain a menace to a large segment of the population. It switched to suicide attack that in the first half of 2018 constituted almost one-third of all fatalities and gradually targeted Muslim houses of worship. In Nigeria's northeast and beyond, it continues to challenge the government, and it claimed that the group is collecting and delivering some essential services in its controlled areas.

The situation in the Lake Chad Basin has affected the ways households and the populace are managing themselves considerable. The Nigerian government's futile efforts at reducing the resourcefulness of Boko Haram have made things for the people much more cumbersome by building barriers to the recovery of essential economic operations such as access to farmlands and commerce are much less evident than the defeat of the insurgency.

Though Boko Haram, mostly wiped out in Yola In Yola, Adamawa State capital, talks with merchants, traffickers and refugee residents demonstrate the difficulties that people face where, regionally speaking, there is insufficient food and violence is high. Government restrictions had also made it much harder to find secure land and adequate resources to recommence cultivation of farmlands or start trading (Matfees, 2017).

According to the United Nations (2017), the humanitarian condition is currently nearing hunger rates quickly and is acute by the severe rates of food insecurity, malnutrition, and exposure to various illnesses. Based on Table 2 above, over 14 million people. The war is projected to have influenced 14 million individuals in all six countries (out of a complete workforce of 18 million), with 8.5 million individuals in dire need of social help. The worst-affected states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, 5.1 million individuals, are presently facing food shortages of Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) phases 3 to 5 (with approximately 100,000 individuals at starvation rates of food insecurity), reflecting a 50 per cent rise since March 2016. 1.2 million kids under five and pregnant and lactating females are undernourished, and approximately 6.9 million individuals are susceptible. The present humanitarian scenario worsened by elevated rates of conflict-induced relocation (with approximately 1.8 million individuals presently affected) as well as voluntary return or migration to regions with insufficient living circumstances.

The overall impact was significant in terms of unemployment and poverty, reduced consumer bargaining power because of rising prices, and a slow decline in state capacity to manage emergency projects and the provision of services on an acceptable level.

Small businesses and small-scale farming have stood destroyed in the process. Small and medium-sized entrepreneurs are the mechanisms that strengthen each society's economic prosperity; as such, any negative disruption to their activities will affect people significantly. This research evaluates the impact of the Boko Haram (BH) uprising on the North-East region of Nigeria's business activities irrespective of the business size. The research examined explicitly several existing works of literature on the insurgency operations of Boko Haram. The research found that Boko-Haram's damaging effect involves the demise of local businesses and will lead to another conflict in the community.

By consequence, local businesses have lost their trade and investment infrastructure because traders in the region, especially in the rural areas, have abandoned their trade and clients, particularly with the businesses with shared local and international borders. The research found that societal safety impacts everyone and everything all; furthermore, by offering appropriate safety, Nigerians, states, the international community, and other associated organisations need to do more to resolve the conflicts. Small and medium-sized business owners and investors must step up their strategies against risks to security and safety to prevent the terrorist from destroying their entire enterprise.

By consequence, farmers' and traders' loss will result in resentment for all concerned. To conclude, Boko-Haram is a lethal terrorist group that is destroying everything it comes across, which includes small industries and medium-sized businesses in Nigeria's North-East.

This thesis is intended to impact the continuing quest for fresh ways to manage the North-East Nigeria question: will the conflict ever come to an end? It equates the leadership management of conflict resolution in Nigeria and demonstrates the problems in handling deep-rooted and complicated disputes. Nigeria's government has adopted cautious constitutional initiatives to quell the conflict, but the continuation of the insurgency still poses concerns about the efficacy of such systems.

Regarding human and natural resources, Nigeria has everything it requires to be good and intends to be among top economies in the world and significant power in Africa. It lays the mechanism for resource exploitation and the appeal of indigenous and foreign investors to fulfil its vision. Notwithstanding the above praiseworthy objective and structure, Nigeria has little if anything significant to demonstrate. It is in the media now that most of its citizens (victims of Boko-Haram) are wallowing in despair with no link to contemporary healthcare delivery system, potable water, decent education, and work opportunities and unable to afford a decent meal a day. This uncomfortable growth or condition/situation results from disastrous assaults on the individuals in the region by the Boko-Haram uprising. Conflicts in the North-East of Nigeria are mostly ideological and economical. The disputes have become contagious and had spread rapidly across the borders to Cameroons and Chad, such as apoptosis. Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall wrote that the mixture of poverty and fragility in countries and organisations causes most disputes in third world countries (Marshall and Gurr, 2001).

What is highly relevant is that in recent years, Nigeria's reasonably high levels of economic progress–the nation once had the third-fastest economic growth rate in the world – did not contain an increased distribution of the benefits of this same development. However, the evidence seems to suggest a broader unequal distribution of wealth hence far more impoverished citizens located within the country. Thus, resulting in disempowerment, resentment, and anger at a time when there is a growing demographic of talented youths with minimal job prospects–some 40 million 18-25-year-olds are jobless or underemployed. These issues were strongly identified by the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) in the 2012 Poverty Survey. That shows that 69% of Nigerians–112 million people-are defined as being on the extreme poverty scale, up from only 17 million in 1980. These are a massive increase. Those estimates are bad enough, but worrying is the potential developments in the populace. According to UN estimations, the current population of 163 million will rise to 389 million by 2050 and more than 700 million by 2100, according to current trends (Ogunde, 2019).

The Effect on The Socio-Economies of The Affected Communities

There is the need, for both government and the people, to be resilience in the face of the insurgency because such mindset is quite crucial to the recovery and rehabilitation of the affected communities. The idea of being resilience always has focused people coming out of war and other tragedies to rebuild themselves and their communities, as with the case of people of Eastern Nigeria aftermath of the Nigeria-Biafran War of 1967-1970. According to The United Kingdom Cabinet Office, in a report published in March of 2011, the term resilience can be defined accordingly in the following way:

Nigeria's North-Eastern economy experienced a significant disaster in the era from 2009, with thousands of internally displaced persons, particularly in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe (Table 3, above), thereby preventing a significant proportion of individuals, residing in the region, the opportunity to engage in their regular pursuits, which caused the region's financial and economic damages. The impact can be viewed in three folds of education, economy, and rebuilding under a Sustainable Program. Amid rising acts of terrorism, insurgency and banditry in the North-East of Nigeria, strengthening the capabilities of impacted groups to maintain communal resilience has now become essential. This is vital in complementing the efforts of different public institutions and NGOs.

All the NGOs and government agencies identified issues regarding the community in which individuals expect instant support and help regardless of emergencies and effects. In an emergency, security and social services must always prioritise those who are most in need, especially where survival is at risk. Increased understanding of danger will be linked to teaching individuals about the facilities they can expect to obtain and how these facilities can impact an incident response and retrieval stage.

Evaluations of the damages by the PCNI (Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative) 2019, have shown the failure to return home of nearly 77 per cent of IDPs currently living with local communities: the principal driving forces listed are the damages to homes, the absence of safety and access to functional and straightforward social services. Some 60% of the IDP inhabitants live with host communities and puts a further strain on already fragile populations. The predicament continues to be exacerbated by continued displacements, along with people from trying to access locations, and social hostilities persist between host and uprooted populations.

The impacted population are at considerable danger for outbreaks which are liable to become pandemics such as cholera, measles and infectious bleeding attributable to inadequate exposure in primary healthcare, environmental variations, a shortage of access to clean drinking water and weaknesses as a consequence of continuous travel from one place to another due to security fear. Women, children and the elderly, in particular, remain increasingly vulnerable to infectious diseases.

The regional violence is rife with gender-based abuse immediate public health intervention is most needed, as girls with a sexual safety threat affect significantly any part of the health of people, particularly an approximated 700,000 women and teens within the reproductive age (PCNI, 2019).

Sustainable socio-economic program

With the Porter’s Diamond Theory in mind, the one-time Finance minister of Nigeria, Mrs Ngozi Okonjo-Iwela (2013), believes that the best way to transform any economy, albeit one that has gone through difficult times, is by providing the necessary resources, and infrastructures, for citizens to use in changing their situation. She added that with the right policies, the government would be killing several birds with a stone. If citizens have control, tradesmen and women in a remote community can earn a living; youngsters can attend schools and be able to learn, functional healthcare facilities can be built and equipped to provide food storage rooms. The only way to achieve this is to have a transparent approach to the implementation of any strategic policies.

The rebuilding of North-East Nigeria, there has to be a healthy political and social-economic plan based on the social justice that has to involve a majority of the populace, and whatever peace would be achieved it has to be used for the resolution of the inherent problems derived from the conflict in the region. These would need a total understanding of the root cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. Two methods of thought process backed by quantitative analysis on the origins of armed conflicts. Easterly's (2004) and Levine's (1997) econometric analysis suggests that internal divisions are one of the leading causes of civil conflict. Although Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998) reached a different conclusion, the real cause of civil conflict is socio-economic and not racial.

There is the need to restore the authorities of both government and traditional systems that were inherent pre-Boko Haram. This will give the affected communities the needed framework to provide the needed internal security structures to compliment that of the Federal Government; this will be strengthened to make resilience against Boko Haram possible – by making locals more conscious of their community and be more pro-active. Additionally, it will lower the risks to the socio-economic system, and loss of social infrastructures are drastically reduced; and generate a long-term growth benefit. The stabilisation steps will also involve the need to inculcate the treatment of the injured populace, both mental and physical. The psychological needs denote the attitude, feelings, and views of the hopelessness of the aftermath of conflicts. Continuing overtures from committed leadership will allow terror-influenced groups to proceed to deal with disruptive problems tomorrow more than they are currently. In this respect, heads of traditional and religious organisations and trustworthy organisations of civil society can play a central position.

There is a need to have an excellent sustainable program to usher-in stability within the affected communities. Stabilisation as defined by the UK Stabilisation Unit in 2018, “is an activity undertaken as an initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence. All stabilisation interventions will be different and shaped by context-specific factors.”

To achieve regional stability, rehabilitation initiatives are essential. Security stabilisation involves the ability to provide adequate security, fairness and justice and other such resources to various local demographic and conventional institutions. The emotional and financial problems of the people who live in the affected social groups devastated by Boko Haram need to be remedied. The mind of the people residing in communities affected by Boko Haram needs to be changed. Post-conflict societies require active mechanisms to develop their resilience. The background causes of Boko Haram's violent activities must be better understood (Reliefweb.int, 2019).

According to Brechenmacher, 2019, political induced aids targets from government recovery initiatives are much more elusive, but Donor schemes from NGOs have helped restore critical public infrastructure and services to an extent. Several NGOs providers noticed that small initiatives to return local governments to its conflict status, have been inadequate due to the long-standing conceptions of negligence, and thus have managed to shift the establishment to provide services to individuals and communities considered at risk of extreme recruitment. Other programmes involve rebuilding and community development to enhance low-level service delivery participation. However, within the government structure, there are significant obstacles to contend with in the long-term planning and implementation of programmes, especially lack of local political oversight and the poor State's efforts to prioritise service provision.

There have been more impacts on rehabilitation into the society of people associated with radical Islamist organisations, but critics tend to be necessary, but do have tight control regarding identification and vestment of terrorist suspects. There is no consistency in the procedure and joint civilian supervision not included. These weaknesses further emphasise the need to maintain a decent amount of pressure to increase openness and transparency in the security sector.

Attempts to rehabilitate leaders and fighters of the Boko Haram jihadist organisations, according to UNHCR 2017, have improved, but there appear to be stifling by the militarized violence approach of the Nigerian government. Donors also sponsored the establishment of and financed local peace and reconciliation programmes to promote demobilisation, deradicalisation, recovery and reconstruction (DDRR). The Nigerian authority, nonetheless, exercises substantial influence over the identification and apprehension of perpetrators of extremism, a procedure which is not subjected to public monitoring and accountability. With little or no proof of ties with violent extremist organisations, numerous captives have been held for years. While there is a minor defector programme, the rehabilitation and consultation with the community must be broadened and improved on, and much more detailed focus must be put on for effectiveness. Such deficiencies also emphasise a need for sustained high-level scrutiny on government accountability and responsibility and transparency, in the security sector in the North-East (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Education Reorientation

The violence of the Boko Haram movement has significantly impacted schooling in North-East, Nigeria. Primary education is a critical necessity for all children throughout the northeast and Nigerian general As the group felt Western education is not good and was banned by it, schools then became BH primary terror targets. The main objectives were, in essence, high schools and universities in the area.

According to Human Right watch, 2013, many children, particularly in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, well before the conflict did not participate in formal schooling. Nevertheless, the proportion of children with no educational opportunities in the area has risen since the violence began, The violent attacks by Boko Haram have affected on the entire social classes in the North-East region of Nigeria, with education sector being the most affected by the violence. Boko Haram, which means Western education is banned in the Hausa language, has murdered in cold blood local teachers, educators and students. An estimated 611 teachers murdered intentionally as well as another 19.000 have since 2009 forced to relocate. More than 2000 people were abducted by the jihadist many of them young girls, since the conflict began, from their colleges. The Boko Haram insurgency damaged more than 910 schools between 2009 and 2015 and forced at least 1,500 schools to close down the area. The attacks also recorded in the northeast. In 2016, there were an additional 950,029 children in school who had fled abuse, thus reducing interest in education in the region and at least an estimated 256 schools were ruined across the state of Borno alone.

The National Bureau of Statistics Education Data Survey (2011) indications show a grim picture of education in the north-western and north-eastern areas. The NBS study shows that 40% of children of primary school age in Borno and Yobe states do not attend school because of the deplorable situation on the ground in the north-eastern part of Nigeria thus the region having the lowest school enrollment in the country. Intimidation, coercion, as well as other adverse factors sometimes contribute to overall confusion to attend schools (Multisectoral Assessment Report, 2014).

Education is the bedrock to any societal development, according to some thinkers in the academic field. As such, there is the need to have a proper and thorough appraisal of the education sector policies concerning the economic development of a nation.

Education is pivotal to development. It is estimated that about 2.8 million children are without access to education as schools and other government infrastructures were the targets of Boko Haram, and thus there is a need to improve the education facilities and training of those affected by the crisis. The education will help in reducing the number of children who are orphans and are likely to be roaming the streets. These children are the hope of the region and will need educating. It is estimated that up to 44% of children of school age are out of school as a consequence of the conflict; this percentage is above the national average of 26%. This disparity will need lots of hard work to tackle.

In general, Nwadiani & Omoike, 2006; Asiyai, 2015, believed that insufficient funding recognised as the most significant education setback in Nigeria. Primarily vocational and education sector because of its capital-intensive nature, of which business training program is a significant component. Due to this fact, every product in the training environment for businesses is subject to insufficient financial resources optimisation. Nevertheless, despite the requirements that varied sectors of the economy have for financial resources, education has found it difficult to hire staff in terms of the quality and quantities, create and modernise the curriculum and to provide a sufficient array of new amenities and resources, including state-of-the-art lecture halls, laboratories, galleries, library. The very fact that business education is being carried out academically and therefore not inclined to furnish beneficiaries with both the necessary features (information, skill sets and mindsets) of earnings, as well as further employment merely, shows that all the recognised questions and obstacles exist. Opining on this challenging condition, Obunadike (2015) argued that the conclusion that the practical classes designed to subject students to real-world training to complement and conform to the theory taught in the curriculum are becoming numerous and less effective.

The conflict in the North-East has contributed to the scarcity of qualified personnel, which has another obstacle to the successful provision of education. In the secondary and the higher education sectors, there is still a lack of qualified workers. The condition at the secondary level is more apparent than in other areas of education. These conditions are to be anticipated because the available funds to skilled workers were inadequate. Ilusanya (2005), noted that Nigeria is were increasingly shameful about the condition of her education system. He spoke about the insufficiency of his workers and their sense of distance from the subject's teachings. Ilemobade (1994) has made comments in the same context on the overall state of education. The writer contended that the education of vocational and technical disciplines was not a concern for educators. If the quality and quantity of teachers are unsatisfactory, it is hard to achieve the broad objectives of comparative education.

Education, economic inequality and corruption on any level will decrease the ability of government and its agencies to provide public goods and limit the spread of influence and power, both soft and repressive, as well as decrease their resistance to disputes. Poverty often leaves the person and society susceptible to rebellion even worse by reducing the cost of rallying support for aggression. In tandem with lower levels of education and growth, the high rates of unemployment and deprivation thought to ease recruiting and inspire fighting. Ultimately, maturity level-appropriate curriculum approaches will be required for youths and young adults to close the educational disparity. Deservedly. Until now, the critical emphasis has been on getting as many schools and colleges open and running. Such services do little to help the majority of ex-combatants emerging from war, and indeed little to benefit more young people, especially teenagers and young adults. It is an essential demographic. A right proportion of teenagers, most of whom are uneducated would be almost entirely uneducated young adults, and their income prospects have significantly diminished due to the conflict. Nevertheless, at the current count, there is no fast-track in the educational and training systems in place in North-East Nigeria (Ushe, 2015).

Recommendation

The belief in this article is that armed disputes mainly connected to endemic corruption. What does leadership entail, however? A detailed management concept is presented by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi as paraphrased here The customs and structures within which sovereignty is exerted in a society. It requires three steps:

(1) the collection, control and succession of regimes.

(2) The government's willingness to devise and enforce reasonable policy efficiently.

(3) Reverence for various institutions that regulate socio-economic relations between for people and the state.

The Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi concept state that in any societies, after any civil unrest, customs and structures through which power is exerted must be equitable. That is, the practises and structures of all parties should be included to ensure better government at all levels compared to what was the leading cause of the civil strife. The two last clusters typically outline widespread and state reverence for the structures that regulate their relationships. Several of these outlines are included several measures in the "Rule of Law" to quantify how committed agents are and comply with social rules. It covers the understanding of crime occurrence, the reliability and the predictability of the courts, and contract enforceability.

These metrics jointly assess a society's progress in creating an atmosphere in which the foundation of economic and social transactions are equal and consistent regulations, particularly the degree to which rule laws are respected (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008).

As has been accepted in this paper, the cause of Boko Haram conflict and its aftermath effect on the populace is not unique to Nigeria, but the economic recovery plan has to be uniquely applied to the context of the regional economic policy setup. Political coherence is one of these tenets' most important, when deprivation is at the heart of the civil conflict, rendering its decline the core goal of economic policy by way of sustainable development, a macroeconomic strategy with a primary objective of a low and stable inflation rate–independent of jobs or expansion–explicitly inconsistent with the overall objective.

The lack of anticipatory intelligence gathering among security services was ascribed to the irregular pattern of post-damage reactions to national security. Boko Haram has exhibited consistency throughout the previous years and appears to represent a considerable risk for the Nigerian government despite losing most of its captured territories. Though it is undoubtedly less formidable than it was in 2015, there is no evidence that it will be defeated in the conceivable future by the government. Meanwhile, the prevalent risk of terrorism significantly reduces the capacity for humanitarian assistance of foreign aid organisations and donor nations. According to various think-tanks in Nigeria, the intelligent services role has been relegated to that of serving the government and not protecting the people. The security operatives in Nigeria is too fragmented and need to be brought under one coherent group to be able to sustain its ability to be relevant in information gathering and law enforcement (Ohain, 2011).

Daily, there is an attack by Boko Haram and counter-attack by the security forces and caught in the middle are hapless poor Nigerians. The audacity of the Group has increased with its unabated attacks on military installations across the North-East, especially in Borno State. The new calmness in the North-East has shown the inroad the Government has made towards ending the terrorist group insurgency, a situation that has taken a frightening dimension. The problem (reasons) that had contributed immensely to the conflict, not peculiar to Nigeria but rather a global phenomenon, has shown the weakness of the Nigerian polity and policy administrations.

To deal effectively with the seemingly never-ending menace of Boko Haram, Nigeria needs to have an all-inclusive government, a government that is willing to be decisive in its actions irrespective of tribe, religion, or political affiliations. This will need the leadership to be committed to the job and not to their pocket and immediate families – as corruption has been seen as one of the significant contributors to the conflicts. Any genuine commitment by the leadership will most likely impact positively on the lives of the populace because of the genuineness of the government to create an enabling environment for an investment opportunity.

Moreover, a responsible government is feasible in so far as individuals are authorized to carry out their responsibilities without fear or favour, are highly motivated to operate enthusiastically and love of country, are not prepared to sell to the highest bidders and are prepared to stand and die for justice and equity. They are determined to do their job without fear or favour. A good government is what Nigeria needs.

This research paper looked at the issues and challenges facing security, business, and education in North-East Nigeria; and how the ability to address the problems and issues surrounding businesses will continue to promote national and regional development. Analysis has shown that businesses face many problems and issues. The study also showed that the incentives to address the various business concerns and security problems would help encourage domestic growth. Based on these findings, it is, however, concluded that insufficient optimisation of education, capital and negative expectations by society seemed to be the reasons behind business-minded persons not fully fitted with the qualifications needed for earning, poverty alleviation, and domestic growth for skill training. The continual dependent on menial jobs that add little to societal, economic development.

The fundamental causes of the violence in contemporary Nigeria are economic impoverishment, marginalisation, resentment, and despair among the broader Nigerian demographic. This dissertation points to the reality that the economic deprivation, lack of proper education, religious understanding and material factors provide a greater understanding of the cause of terrorism in contemporary Nigeria, recognising within the framework of the role of religion and government in terrorism.

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